Page 33 - THE SOUTH CHINA BUSINESS JOURNAL
P. 33
istry of Commerce’s administrative data on participation in calling out violations could deter
registered firms. all firms from violating given a shared expectation
of the costs of violating pollution standards.
Public pressure improves environmental
performance. The researchers found that Researchers found evidence of the latter:
public appeals to the regulator through social reductions among targeted plants were not
media reduced violations by more than 60%, and undone by increased emissions from other
decreased air and water pollutant (SO2 and COD) plants, suggesting that public appeals also have a
concentrations by 12.2% and 3.7% relative to deterrent effect on untargeted firms.
the control group, respectively. In contrast, even
when using essentially the same content and Public participation meaningfully decreases
wording as the public appeals, private appeals pollution in China. This study provides
caused only modest improvements in the firms’ evidence on the impacts of public pressure
environmental performance. Researchers noted in environmental governance, underscoring
that emissions reductions were concentrated the power of social media in facilitating citizen
among plants that grossly exceeded the standard involvement in enforcing policies in China. Such
prior to the experiment, rather than those just findings suggest that social media provides
above the standard, and the violations reductions strong signals of public demand for stringent
were concentrated among plants that frequently enforcement, which in turn prompts regulators
exceeded the standard prior to the experiment. to recalibrate their approach to the tradeoffs
involved with environmental regulation. Indeed,
Social media visibility key to regulatory regulators seem to use participation to gauge
response. Researchers found that increasing the the value of imposing costly regulations on firms,
visibility of social media appeals about a violation and particularly so when lax enforcement has
by adding “likes” and “shares” to the Weibo the potential to generate publicity. Moreover, the
post increased regulatory effort. Specifically, failure to strictly enforce existing environmental
boosting visibility caused an increase in the policies is unlikely due to limited regulatory
probability of a regulator replying to the appeal capacity, but instead largely driven by the lack of
by 40%, a doubling of the length of written bottom-up pressure. Taken together, evidence
replies to appeals, and the probability of an suggests that when the public gets more involved
onsite investigation of a violating firm to jump by in China’s process of environmental governance,
nearly 65%. Such findings suggest that increased the regulatory relationship between government
regulatory effort following public appeals is an and polluting firms is reshaped and that the
important source of the positive impact on firms’ result is increased governmental effort and lower
environmental performance. pollution emissions by firms.
Public participation Impact of public/private appeals on firm emissions violations
generates positive
indirect impact. While
researchers established
a direct link between
citizen participation and
lower emission output, it
is possible that indirect
impacts could reduce or
even completely undo
any direct impacts of
citizen participation. For
example, if there exists
a binding regulatory
capacity constraint,
appealing against the
treatment firms might
cause control firms
to receive reduced
regulatory oversight,
leading to higher
emissions from them.
Alternatively, public
SOUTH CHINA BUSINESS JOURNAL 30
registered firms. all firms from violating given a shared expectation
of the costs of violating pollution standards.
Public pressure improves environmental
performance. The researchers found that Researchers found evidence of the latter:
public appeals to the regulator through social reductions among targeted plants were not
media reduced violations by more than 60%, and undone by increased emissions from other
decreased air and water pollutant (SO2 and COD) plants, suggesting that public appeals also have a
concentrations by 12.2% and 3.7% relative to deterrent effect on untargeted firms.
the control group, respectively. In contrast, even
when using essentially the same content and Public participation meaningfully decreases
wording as the public appeals, private appeals pollution in China. This study provides
caused only modest improvements in the firms’ evidence on the impacts of public pressure
environmental performance. Researchers noted in environmental governance, underscoring
that emissions reductions were concentrated the power of social media in facilitating citizen
among plants that grossly exceeded the standard involvement in enforcing policies in China. Such
prior to the experiment, rather than those just findings suggest that social media provides
above the standard, and the violations reductions strong signals of public demand for stringent
were concentrated among plants that frequently enforcement, which in turn prompts regulators
exceeded the standard prior to the experiment. to recalibrate their approach to the tradeoffs
involved with environmental regulation. Indeed,
Social media visibility key to regulatory regulators seem to use participation to gauge
response. Researchers found that increasing the the value of imposing costly regulations on firms,
visibility of social media appeals about a violation and particularly so when lax enforcement has
by adding “likes” and “shares” to the Weibo the potential to generate publicity. Moreover, the
post increased regulatory effort. Specifically, failure to strictly enforce existing environmental
boosting visibility caused an increase in the policies is unlikely due to limited regulatory
probability of a regulator replying to the appeal capacity, but instead largely driven by the lack of
by 40%, a doubling of the length of written bottom-up pressure. Taken together, evidence
replies to appeals, and the probability of an suggests that when the public gets more involved
onsite investigation of a violating firm to jump by in China’s process of environmental governance,
nearly 65%. Such findings suggest that increased the regulatory relationship between government
regulatory effort following public appeals is an and polluting firms is reshaped and that the
important source of the positive impact on firms’ result is increased governmental effort and lower
environmental performance. pollution emissions by firms.
Public participation Impact of public/private appeals on firm emissions violations
generates positive
indirect impact. While
researchers established
a direct link between
citizen participation and
lower emission output, it
is possible that indirect
impacts could reduce or
even completely undo
any direct impacts of
citizen participation. For
example, if there exists
a binding regulatory
capacity constraint,
appealing against the
treatment firms might
cause control firms
to receive reduced
regulatory oversight,
leading to higher
emissions from them.
Alternatively, public
SOUTH CHINA BUSINESS JOURNAL 30
