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P. 37
oughout the week, when not meeting with unleased an antagonistic reaction toward Soviet
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and other Chinese rule in Eastern Europe.
officials, Nixon attended cultural and athletic
performances and more banquets, and toured The 37th US president’s arrival came after
such architectural and artistic treasures as the more than 20 years of hostility and almost no
Forbidden City, Ming Tombs, and the Great contact between the two countries. The eight-day
Wall of China. "I think that you would have to visit would open the door for the formation of
conclude that this is a great wall," the President diplomatic relations between the world's richest
observed, when pressed for comment, "and it country and its most populous. It would also
had to be built by a great people." reshape the world order as it was known: shifting
the power dynamics of the Cold War and playing
Nixon seemed an unlikely candidate to thaw a part in China's transition from impoverished
those chilly relations. During the 1940s and isolation to a new role as a growing global power
1950s, he had been a vocal cold warrior broker and economic partner to the United States.
and had condemned the Democratic Harry
Truman’s administration of “losing” China to Nixon was more than happy to develop a
the communists in 1949. The decision to fly to functional relationship with a convenient
Beijing for an official visit was publicly shocking partner that would instigate instability within
to some. the Communist bloc and offer a potential
counterbalance against Moscow. According to The
The situation changed dramatically by 1972, Diplomat, the China event was to signal to Russia
though. The US was searching for a turning that Nixon’s approach to diplomacy was not
point in the Cold War as the conflict in Vietnam purely rooted in ideology, “It was this distinctive
entered its second decade. A visit to China was blend of pragmatism, bluffing brinkmanship,
more than a simple symbolic gesture. The media and strategic deception that precipitated his
spectacle equipped Nixon with the leverage to presidency’s foreign policy successes.”
force Moscow concessions over Vietnam and
The “Only Nixon could go to China” adage that
followed the visit in both political circles and
movie scripts, however, not only preserves
the historic visit’s importance, it also provides
insights for China-American relations today.
Perhaps it is true that only Nixon could have
broken the ice between the two countries, given
his distinctively hawkish and conservative stance
against China during his ascent to power. Nixon
was widely viewed to be a leading voice in the
country’s struggle against communism. But the
converse equally holds true. Only Chairman Mao
Zedong – with his consolidated presence as the
supreme leader of Chinese politics – could have
had the political resolve and wherewithal to push
back against the strong undercurrents of the
Chinese Cultural Revolution to initiate ties with
the United States.
The week-long visit concluded with the signing
of the Shanghai communique. On 27 February
1972, the United States “acknowledged” that
“all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan
is a part of China”. The US also reaffirmed “its
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question by the Chinese themselves”.
SOUTH CHINA BUSINESS JOURNAL 34
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and other Chinese rule in Eastern Europe.
officials, Nixon attended cultural and athletic
performances and more banquets, and toured The 37th US president’s arrival came after
such architectural and artistic treasures as the more than 20 years of hostility and almost no
Forbidden City, Ming Tombs, and the Great contact between the two countries. The eight-day
Wall of China. "I think that you would have to visit would open the door for the formation of
conclude that this is a great wall," the President diplomatic relations between the world's richest
observed, when pressed for comment, "and it country and its most populous. It would also
had to be built by a great people." reshape the world order as it was known: shifting
the power dynamics of the Cold War and playing
Nixon seemed an unlikely candidate to thaw a part in China's transition from impoverished
those chilly relations. During the 1940s and isolation to a new role as a growing global power
1950s, he had been a vocal cold warrior broker and economic partner to the United States.
and had condemned the Democratic Harry
Truman’s administration of “losing” China to Nixon was more than happy to develop a
the communists in 1949. The decision to fly to functional relationship with a convenient
Beijing for an official visit was publicly shocking partner that would instigate instability within
to some. the Communist bloc and offer a potential
counterbalance against Moscow. According to The
The situation changed dramatically by 1972, Diplomat, the China event was to signal to Russia
though. The US was searching for a turning that Nixon’s approach to diplomacy was not
point in the Cold War as the conflict in Vietnam purely rooted in ideology, “It was this distinctive
entered its second decade. A visit to China was blend of pragmatism, bluffing brinkmanship,
more than a simple symbolic gesture. The media and strategic deception that precipitated his
spectacle equipped Nixon with the leverage to presidency’s foreign policy successes.”
force Moscow concessions over Vietnam and
The “Only Nixon could go to China” adage that
followed the visit in both political circles and
movie scripts, however, not only preserves
the historic visit’s importance, it also provides
insights for China-American relations today.
Perhaps it is true that only Nixon could have
broken the ice between the two countries, given
his distinctively hawkish and conservative stance
against China during his ascent to power. Nixon
was widely viewed to be a leading voice in the
country’s struggle against communism. But the
converse equally holds true. Only Chairman Mao
Zedong – with his consolidated presence as the
supreme leader of Chinese politics – could have
had the political resolve and wherewithal to push
back against the strong undercurrents of the
Chinese Cultural Revolution to initiate ties with
the United States.
The week-long visit concluded with the signing
of the Shanghai communique. On 27 February
1972, the United States “acknowledged” that
“all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan
is a part of China”. The US also reaffirmed “its
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question by the Chinese themselves”.
SOUTH CHINA BUSINESS JOURNAL 34
